The Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 and the Presidential Proclamation of 23 July 2001 were two extra-constitutional presidential actions arising from structural deadlock among state institutions, despite being separated by more than four decades and differing political contexts. This article analyzes the constitutional validity of both actions and their impact on the checks and balances mechanism within Indonesian constitutional law following the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. This study employs normative legal research using statutory, historical, and conceptual approaches, supported by descriptive qualitative analysis of primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials. The findings show that the validity of the 1959 Decree is more accurately assessed through the doctrine of staatsnoodrecht, given that the Constitutional Assembly was functionally paralyzed at the time and the President's action subsequently gained de facto recognition from the House of Representatives. In contrast, the 2001 Proclamation received no such recognition from any state institution and was declared unlawful by the Supreme Court, ultimately leading to President Abdurrahman Wahid's removal by the People's Consultative Assembly. The differing outcomes of these two events demonstrate that the risk of abuse of presidential emergency power depends on the capacity of other state institutions to restrain and scrutinize such actions. Both events also gave rise to significant constitutional restrictions, particularly the prohibition on dissolving the House of Representatives and the establishment of a judicial impeachment mechanism through the Constitutional Court. This article recommends strengthening legislative and judicial oversight of presidential emergency powers to prevent similar patterns from recurring in the future.